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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
the defendant never would have obtained the performance bond in the
absence of Ferrante's assurances. Moreover, Ferrante insisted that partial
payment checks were to be made payable to him and the defendant
jointly. The court nevertheless held that these facts were insufficient to
sustain jurisdiction over him.
Justice McNally, in a strong dissent,28 argued for a more liberal
construction of CPLR 302; one that would take full advantage of the
Supreme Court's decisons in International Shoe Co. v. Washington29
and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.30 without offending the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The dissent believed that
Ferrante's activities, including those prior to and those subsequent to
the execution of the performance bond and indemnity agreement, "in
their entirety and in combination more than meet the statutory test of
his transaction of business in New York. ' 13
Few transactions of business would seem more purposefully con-
nected with New York than the execution of an indemnity agreement
for work to be performed in New York.32 However, it appears that the
first department has chosen to cling to the relatively safe jurisdictional
nexuses of physical presence and domestic execution of a contract
rather than venture forth on a jurisdictional limb which is strong
enough to bear the additional weight without breaking.
CPLR 302(a)(1): Retention of New York attorney is "transaction of
business" within the state if defendant authorized institution of New
York action.
Non-domiciliaries may subject themselves to the in personam juris-
diction of New York courts by transacting business in the state in
person or through an agent.33 Therefore, when the plaintiff in an action
is employed by a non-domiciliary defendant, and the cause of action
arises from the employment, the nature of the relationship may well
prove determinative. Where the plaintiff is an agent, his acts in New
28 Id. at 356, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 987 (dissenting opinion).
20 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
30 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
3131 App. Div. 2d at 358, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
32 Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13 (1969):
(3) If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota to
be performed in whole or in part by either party in Minnesota ... such [act]
shall be deemed to be doing business in Minnesota by the foreign corporation
and shall be deemed equivalent to th pointmnt te foreign corporation
of the secretary of the State of Minnesota and his successors to be its true and
lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions orproceedings against the f reign corporation arising from r growing out of uch
contract ....
3 CPLR 302(a)(1).
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York may furnish the jurisdictional predicate necessary under CPLR
802; where he is retained as an independent contractor, his acts will
not be considered to have been those of the defendant for jurisdictional
purposes.
Thus, in A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, LDA, 84 jurisdiction could not
be obtained over the non-domiciliary defendant by the plaintiff on the
basis of plaintiff's acts in New York since the plaintiff was an inde-
pendent broker. And in Winick v. Jackson,3 5 the court held that as the
plaintiff-attorneys were independent contractors, the out-of-state domicil-
iary who had engaged them to represent her in a New York probate
proceeding was not subject to jurisdiction. In contrast, the court in
Schneider v. J. & C. Carpet Co.86 sustained personal jurisdiction over
the non-domiciliary defendant in an action by its employee for breach
of the employment contract 7
Professor McLaughlin has strongly opposed this distinction:88
Although CPLR 302 uses the word "agent," there is no reason
to give the term a narrow reading. Reference should be made to
... [Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.,39 and Gelfand
v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.40] . . . where the need for a true
agency in the "doing business" cases seems to have been eliminated.
If all that is required under CPLR 302 is a purposeful act invoking
the benefits and protections of New York law, there seems to be no
valid reason why a court should become ensnared in the technical
rules of agency. 41
In Elman v. Belson,42 the supreme court, although presented with
an opportunity to adopt Professor McLaughlin's view, felt constrained
to follow the Millner decision, thereby illustrating, indeed, self-ad-
mittedly, the difficulties inherent in such distinctions. The Illinois de-
fendant in Elman had retained Chicago attorneys after having secured
an Illinois judgment against some New York individuals and corpora-
tions. The Chicago attorneys in turn retained the plaintiffs, copartners
of a New York law firm, to bring suit on the Illinois judgment in New
York. Plaintiffs accordingly obtained a New York judgment with the
assistance of the Chicago attorneys, and they then sought to recover
34 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Ist Dep't 1966).
35 49 Misc. 2d 1009, 268 N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
3 23 App. Div. 2d 103, 258 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1st Dep't 1965).
3a See generally The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
279, 294 (1966).
38 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary 104, 105-06 (1968).
30 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).
40 385 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1967).
41 See generally 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 301, supp. commentary 89, 90-92 (1968).
4258 Misc. 2d 271, 298 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).
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from the defendant in quantum meruit for their services in that con-
nection. Defendant never entered New York personally, and he con-
tended that the New York court had failed to obtain jurisdiction over
him because his Chicago attorneys were "independent contractors" and
not "agents"; therefore, their acts in New York could not be attributed
to him.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, but Justice Meyer
denied the motion without prejudice since the papers failed to indicate
whether or not the defendant had authorized the Chicago attorneys to
proceed in New York on the Illinois judgment. In the court's view, if
defendant had authorized the institution of the action on the Illinois
judgment in New York, then the retention of the plaintiffs by the
Chicago attorneys was an act by agents of the defendant. However, if
the Chicago attorneys had independently determined there was a need
to engage the plaintiffs, their actions were those of independent con-
tractors which could not be deemed to be the acts of the defendant.
The defendant would be able to establish the nature of the Chicago
attorneys' acts in his answer when he again asserted that the New York
courts lacked jurisdiction over him.
Justice Meyer has dealt with the problem of the agent-indepen-
dent contractor dilemma in an exemplary manner. However, it is
hoped that either an appellate authority or the legislature recognizes
the immediate need to reconsider Millner and CPLR 302(a) in the light
of both Elman and Professor McLaughlin's position. Access to the New
York courts should not be denied to residents who perform purposeful
acts within the state on behalf of non-domiciliaries merely because of
technical distinctions which often prove meaningless for jurisdictional
purposes.
CPLR 308(4): Substituted service permitted upon plaintiff's own in-
surer as "real party in interest."
CPLR 308(1), (2) and (3) provide three methods by which service of
a summons upon a natural person shall be made.43 CPLR 308(4), how-
ever, allows a court to substitute a fourth method of its own choosing
when service by one of the other three methods proves impracticable.
Of course, the alternate method which a court directs must meet due
process requirements.
43 By delivery to such person within the state; by delivery within the state to his
agent designated pursuant to CPLR 318; and by mailing the summons to such person's
last known address and ensuring that thU summons is also properly left at his place of
business, dwelling house or usual place of abode within the state. CPLR 308.
1969]
